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Abstract 
 
Through the media, there seems to be general consensus that financial celebrities 
affect stock prices. We investigate this issue by studying the mandatory 
notifications of trade and the corresponding stock returns on OSE in the period 
from 1992 to 2008. We find that stocks that are bought and sold by these investors 
earn abnormal return in the short term. The immediate effect of a buy is larger 
than the effect of a sell, however, through the full short term event window the 
total effect of a sell is larger than the effect of a buy. In both cases there is an 
underreaction to the announcement, increasing the trading possibilities for other 
investors. Our findings imply that there exists a celebrity premium and that the 
celebrity trading, through herding in the market, affects the stock prices. The 
herding   itself  may   be   caused   by   the   celebrities’   stock   picking   ability   related   to  
superior private information, the value of having an experienced investor as 
shareholder  and  other  investors’  overconfidence  in the celebrity investors. Either 
way, our study indicates that herding is individually rational in the shorter term, 
but not on an aggregate level. In the longer term we observe an incomplete 
reversion concerning a buy, while stocks sold by the celebrity investors continue 
its downward slope in terms of abnormal return. 
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1. Introduction 
 
There are frequent headliners in the Norwegian financial newspapers reporting 
that a stock sky rocketed after being bought by a financial celebrity and vice versa 
if the stock instead was sold. The media is constantly concerned with this, 
rationalizing and explaining the development in the markets as reactions to these 
trades. The trades are not only given their own headlines, but are also included in 
stock comments describing today’s  or   this  week’s  activity.   In  other  words, these 
trades are given great attention in the financial news press and the celebrity 
investors are presented as herd leaders, which is what we will study in this thesis. 
The media is either correct in general, that the celebrities really affect stock 
prices, or the media is carefully picking a combination of celebrity trades and 
abnormal stock performance in order to present a good story. The latter would not 
be surprising, while the former would be interesting from an economic point of 
view. If these investors affect stock prices through trading alone, an analysis of 
this mechanism is interesting both in terms of theoretical finance as well as in 
terms of actual trading possibilities. 
 
If the financial celebrities really affect stock prices, we should document a 
celebrity premium. We define “celebrity premium” as the excess return on stocks 
traded by the celebrity investors, exceeding the return implied by the market 
model. As shorting stocks is possible, the term is also valid for a stock price 
decline. Our analysis reveals that stocks bought by the celebrity investors earn an 
immediate cumulative abnormal return of 5.11% in the three days around the 
event day1, with a continued drift of 2.77% from day 2 to day 15. This implies 
that there is in fact a significant celebrity premium. Similarly, stocks sold by the 
celebrity investors earn an immediate cumulative abnormal return of -4.43% in 
the event window around the transaction, with a continued drift of -7.13% in the 
following 13 days. These returns are both statistically and economically 
significant for both purchases and sales. This implies that the celebrity investor 
have the most immediate impact on the market when revealing a positive view on 
a company. However, the most overall impact on the market when revealing a 
negative view on a company throughout the full short term event window. In 
                                                 
1 When considering days in this thesis, it should be understood as trading days relative to the 
announcement day. 
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addition, the premium indicates that there is herding in the market. The 
development of abnormal returns in the 21-day event window implies that there is 
an underreaction following the event, and rather than reversion we observe that 
the abnormal return is increasing in the entire short term window with the same 
sign as the immediate effect. This implies that the market participants are herding 
in a rational sense, as they are part of the rise in stock prices. In the longer term, 
the impression of underreaction is more uncertain. In the case of a buy, we 
observe that the stocks yield positive abnormal returns in the first 6 months, 
followed by a partial reversion with negative abnormal returns in the following 6 
months. In the case of a sell, the stocks continue their downward slope, with 
negative abnormal returns, throughout our whole event period, however flattening 
out towards the end of our one year event window after the announcement. 
 
A  study  of  financial  celebrities’  separate impact on the stock market has, to our 
knowledge, never before been conducted in Norway. However, a closely related 
study of the American investor Warren Buffett and his company Berkshire 
Hathaway, have been conducted by Hughes, Liu and Zhang (2010), revealing that 
investors should be able to earn similar returns as Buffett simply by following his 
investments decisions. This however, is seldom the case and the authors attribute 
this to underreaction caused by investors’ overconfidence2 in her or his own 
abilities, neglecting the possibility of Buffett’s  superior  private   information. Our 
study is also closely related to studies of herd behaviour, rationality and the role 
of media. In addition, studies of insider trading are relevant, due to the fact that 
many celebrity traders are insiders. Regarding herd behaviour, a growing body of 
literature is devoted to the aspect, however taking different paths.  
 
In the simplest form, financial herding is defined as a group of investors trading in 
the same direction over a period of time (Nofsinger and Sias 1999). Imitation and 
mimicry are perhaps one of our most basic human instincts and it is a prominent 
belief that investors are influenced by the decision of other investors (Welch 
1996). A further definition of herding may be difficult to state, however Welch 
has stated that herding is clearly related to behavioural patterns. The two polar 
                                                 
2 Note the twofold  use  of  “overconfidence”  throughout this study as a result of the twofold use by 
several authors of financial studies. Overconfidence is either understood as overconfidence in 
others or as overconfidence in yourself, as in self-confidence. 
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views of herding in the literature are the non-rational and the rational view of the 
mechanisms driving herd behaviour. The non-rational view focus on investor 
psychology and claims that investors follow one another blindly and foregoing 
rational analysis, while the rational view focus on externalities and claims that 
optimal decision-making is being distorted by information difficulties or incentive 
issues (Welch 1996). 
 
Also related to herding, Shiller (2000) has stated that aspects of overconfidence 
imply trusting experts. While focusing on the irrationality of herding he also states 
that herding may also be individually rational, but irrational as group behaviour, 
arising from information cascade defined as  theories  of  “the  failure  of  information  
about true fundamental value to be  disseminated  and  evaluated”. Scharfstein and 
Stein (1990) have suggested that managers simply mimic the investment decisions 
of  others  to  avoid  the  risk  of  being  “lone  fools”  and  also  “sharing  the  blame”, and 
that herding could provide a partial explanation for excessive stock market 
volatility. Relating herding to the media, Tetlock (2007) have found that high 
media pessimism predicts a downward pressure on prices and the findings suggest 
that media content serve as a proxy for investor sentiment or non-informational 
trading.  
 
The financial celebrities involved in our sample represent a small group of 
wealthy investors well known for their business activities, either through 
entrepreneurship, pure investments or both. The small group of people of course 
implies that the same people have been observed buying todays and tomorrow’s 
winners over and over again and the general public may very well perceive them 
to make good decisions and a substantial return in the stock market. Their good 
performance in the past, affecting the media coverage and their status as 
celebrities constitutes a selection bias. This bias has however been avoided in this 
study, as we have only included observations occurring after their status as 
celebrities already have been acknowledged. 
 
What we have studied in our thesis is whether investors defined as financial 
celebrities are affecting the stock market, by studying the mandatory notifications 
of trade in the period 1992 to 2008. We add to the literature by studying three 
issues; first, we aim to study what we have defined as a celebrity premium. That 
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is, whether these investors earn an abnormal return without any other obvious 
explanation. Second, we would like to study whether the investors in fact function 
as herd leaders that are being followed by the other investors. Third, we would 
link the results to the aspects of market reaction, market efficiency, confidence 
and rationality. 
 
Due to lack of data, our study is not conclusive on all topics, but instead 
suggesting possible explanations. For instance, traded volume is only available for 
a limited number of observations and therefore excluded. In addition, the model of 
normal returns should have included a variable for analyst recommendations in 
order to remove the effect of possible correlated information arrival in 
independently acting investors (Welch 1996). Historical analyst recommendations 
is however also unavailable for most of our observations. Another challenge is 
that the investors are often trading in companies where they are insiders. Insider 
trading however is regulated through the Norwegian Securities Trading Act, and 
trading on undisclosed information is prohibited. A study by Eckbo and Smith 
(1998) confirms that insiders, in general, do not earn abnormal return. Einarsen 
(2009) on the other hand concludes in the opposite direction and finds that 
insiders earn, on average 1.3% abnormal return in the three days around the day of 
announcement. These studies are not consistent with each other, and the 
documentation of abnormal returns is not of the same magnitude as our results. 
Therefore, the implication of abnormal returns accruing from insider information 
is disregarded in this study. However, for drawing inferences from this study of 
the Norwegian market to an aggregate international market, this implication 
should be reconsidered based on insider studies in other countries. 
 
Having these implications in mind, this study implies that the celebrity investors 
are herd leaders in the Norwegian market, that there is a celebrity premium, and 
that it is possible to earn an abnormal return by trading the same stocks which our 
sample of celebrities trade, due to the underreaction and lack of reversion in the 
short term. In the longer term the argument for stocks sold by the celebrities 
follow the same pattern, while the picture is not so decisive when it comes to 
stocks being bought due to a partial reversion of the abnormal returns. 
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2. Literature review 
 
Up to this point, little research has been conducted on the specific topic of 
financial celebrities and whether they affect stock prices. Although the literature 
considering financial professionals trading is growing, the exact field of financial 
celebrities is not as well studied. The exception is the American study of Warren 
Buffett (Hughes, Liu, and Zhang 2010) as previously mentioned. However, there 
is important literature to consider in closely related fields of finance. The 
literature is divided into three main categories; the first part of this review focuses 
on financial professionals. The second on herding in the financial markets, while 
the third part reviews research regarding media’s role in the financial markets.  
2.1 Financial professionals 
Although the study of Warren Buffett is the only one we have found conducted on 
the specific topic of financial celebrities, there are several studies of the 
performance   of   financial   professionals’   performance in the stock market. 
Financial experts are a vaguely defined group, ranging from financial analysts, 
brokers, portfolio managers, journalists in financial newspapers, and others who 
are considered a professional for some reason, and it is reasonable to believe that 
the financial celebrities also fit in to this group. One study by Womack (1996) 
shows that the recommendations of financial analysts affect stock prices, and 
induce initial abnormal returns as well as a drift in the following period. This is 
attributed   to   the   analysts’   stock   picking   ability,   and   the   drift   indicates   that   the  
analysts are gathering relevant information. Further, Coval et al. (2005) finds that 
some individuals also are able to outperform the market. The authors divided their 
sample of traders into two, and measured if the top 10% traders the first period 
continued to be the best in the next period. Their conclusion is indeed that the best 
traders continued to outperform the worst 10% with about 8% per year, and that if 
other investors mimicked these 10% best, they would earn an abnormal return of 
5 basis points each day. Another relevant study for our paper is Hughes, Lui and 
Zhang (2010), where the authors have analysed the market reactions of the trading 
by the famous American investor Warren Buffett. Their findings are that the 
market underreacts to news about changes in the portfolio of Berkshire Hathaway. 
If market participants had actually mimicked this portfolio by buying and selling 
the same stocks immediately after they are made public, they would have earned 
GRA 19001 – Master thesis  01.09.2011 
Page 6 
approximately the same abnormal return as Buffett himself. The authors attribute 
this to overconfident investors, who are put too much weight on their own 
information, disregarding the information revealed by the portfolio 
announcements of Berkshire Hathaway.  
2.2 Herding 
The literature on financial professionals indicates herding, either implicitly or 
explicitly. Therefore a thorough explanation of this phenomenon is relevant. 
Herding is a well-known phenomenon in financial markets, and has been given a 
lot of attention in recent studies. The main idea behind the concept of herding is 
that investors tend to follow each other, mimicking the trading performed by 
others rather than to follow their own intuition and beliefs. This may lead to 
exaggerated movements in stock prices, which is the subject of our analysis. 
Further, the literature is divided into the two polar views of herding; the irrational 
and the rational view.  
  
A discussion on irrational herding is found in the book Irrational Exuberance by 
Robert Shiller (2000). Here, Shiller describes the phenomena of herding in the 
financial markets. In order to explain herding, several experiments are cited, 
saying  that  when  someone’s  actions  are  considered  “cannot  be  wrong”,  then one 
would act in the same manner. Shiller also cites another experiment and states that 
“people have learned that when experts tell them something is all right, it 
probably  is,  even  if  it  does  not  seem  so” (159). These issues are all related to the 
aspect of overconfidence. Shiller continues with that even completely rational 
people can participate in herd behaviour when they take into account the 
judgements of others, and even if they know that everyone else is behaving in a 
“herd-like” manner. Although individually rational, the group behaviour would be 
irrational, arising from information cascade,  defined  as  “theories  of  the failure of 
information   about   true   fundamental   value   to   be   disseminated   and   evaluated” 
(152). 
 
While Shiller argues that herding is irrational, Devenow and Welch (1996) 
reviews models of rational herding. The prevailing model in modern research is 
the model of information cascade. This theory explains that although one investor 
has negative information, it will be overshadowed if there are indications that 
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other investors have positive information. This reaction will continue, as investor 
will bid up the price of the company based on other investors implied information.  
 
Further, Scharfstein and Stein (1990) presented an article on herd behaviour and 
investment, and how managers simply mimic the investment decisions of other 
managers. Although such decisions may be inefficient, they take place because 
managers  are  concerned  with   their   reputation  and   the  risk  of  being  “lone  fools”.  
As with all unpredictable components, prediction errors occur. However by 
mimicking they will also  be   “sharing   the   blame”.  Several   effects  may   therefore  
drive herd behaviour, many of them psychological. The authors, more relevantly, 
also relates the same basic insight to the stock market, where herd behaviour 
could provide a partial explanation for excessive stock market volatility and the 
amplification of exogenous shocks. Related to our topic, the psychological aspects 
provided in this study may explain why investors mimic other, well-known 
investors in order to compensate for the unpredictability in the market.   
 
So far we have focused on literature concerning individual psychological patterns. 
In order to be able to significantly move prices in a certain way, we find it 
reasonable to believe that institutional investors also represent a part of the herd of 
investors at Oslo Stock Exchange. Nofsinger and Sias (1999) document strong 
positive correlation between changes in institutional ownership and returns. They 
claim that these results suggest that either institutional investors positive-feedback 
trade more than individual investors or institutional herding impacts prices more 
than herding by individual investors. In addition they find that stocks purchased 
by institutional investors subsequently outperform those they sell in the following 
year, revealing no evidence of irrationality. The authors further argue that price 
momentum after herding is consistent with herding moving prices towards 
equilibrium and is thus stabilizing. If momentum traders drive the prices too high, 
the concern is that this would ultimately cause a price bubble. Further, Kim and 
Nofsinger (2005) have investigated herding and feedback trading by institutional 
and individual investor in Japan, a country known for its long-term business 
relationships. These relationships allow for the institutions to have better private 
information than outsiders. Herding based on this superior information is referred 
to as investigative herding. Different types of firms, during different economic 
regimes were analysed, concluding that herding affected current-, prior- and 
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subsequent  year’s  return.  This  may  be  directly  related  to  our  research  in  the  way  
that the financial celebrities may have, or are believed to have, private 
information, even though Norway has a different business culture. 
2.3 Media 
In the process of gathering data, our starting point was the Atekst-database of the 
largest Norwegian newspapers. The reason for this is that a search in newspapers 
is an efficient way to identify celebrities. An implication of this method of 
celebrity identification is that we cannot exclude the possibility that the media 
coverage actually plays a role in itself, in addition to the celebrity effect. If the 
media play a role in changing stock prices it would be related to our thesis, 
because our sample of financial celebrities have a large exposure in the media. 
The media also act as a messenger, providing an informational connection 
between the herd leaders and the rest of the market.  
 
Tetlock (2007) have investigated the role of media in the stock market. The author 
found that high media pessimism predicts a downward pressure on prices, 
followed by a reversion to fundamentals. In addition, high or low pessimism 
usually also predicts high trading volume. The findings suggest that measures of 
media content serve as a proxy for investor sentiment or non-informational 
trading.   The   author’s   motivation   has   been   to   provide   theories   of   abnormal  
movements in the stock market that are seemingly unjustified by fundamentals, as 
we might observe in our study.  
 
Fang and Peress (2009) have investigated the relation between media coverage 
and expected stock returns. Mass media has a broad reach and the hypothesis is 
that security pricing is affected, even if the media does not supply genuine news. 
However, as one might expect this effect, the study shows that stocks with no 
media coverage earn higher returns than stock with high media coverage. It seems 
to   be,  what   the   authors   name,   a   “no-media   premium”.  The   authors   provide   two  
main explanations, namely that it is a liquidity phenomenon or a compensation for 
imperfect diversification. The study further on indicates that the media effect is 
stronger the more incomplete the information is to begin with, as with small firms, 
with low analyst coverage and high fraction of individual ownership. The authors 
also provide an important implication of media content, that due to publication 
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delays, it is unlikely that the information provided is actual news. In our own 
thinking, this may also be the case for non-printed media, as there still are sources 
of delay present. This is in fact one of the reasons why we have chosen to only 
use Newsweb data. 
 
Although the literature on our specific topic is limited, the literature in closely 
related fields is comprehensive, and what we would utilize further on in this study 
is how financial professionals operate in the market and the phenomena of 
herding. Most importantly, the evidence that the best traders continue to 
outperform the market based on their stock picking abilities and how other 
investors may earn abnormal returns by mimicking these trades. However, in 
order to explain our results and offer explanations to the induced phenomena of 
financial celebrities affecting stock prices, behaviour finance offers highly 
relevant psychological aspects to consider. Most importantly is the aspect of 
herding and whether or not this action is rational. 
 
3. Research question 
 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate if financial celebrities affect stock 
prices. By focusing mainly on the short term, we will try to find if there is a 
celebrity premium as defined in the introduction. Such a premium would imply 
that the celebrity investors constitute positive or negative news to the market and 
hence work as herd leaders that are being followed by the other investors. 
 
The main research question is hence if financial celebrities affect stock prices. In 
order to test this hypothesis we have focused on other sub-questions in order to 
capture the different effects, and their economic implications. First of all we aim 
to document the celebrity premium in the short and longer term, and why there is 
such a premium. Second we aim to document whether these celebrities are herd 
leaders in the market, and whether or not this herding is rational. We also want to 
analyse if there are different results in the case of a sell or a buy, because it 
provides insight regarding the reactions on perceived positive versus negative 
news. 
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The main hypothesis is that financial celebrities affect stock prices, and do this 
through inducing positive or negative news to other investors, encouraging them 
to herd and hereby induce an abnormal return, i.e. the celebrity premium. We also 
expect that the herding is irrational in the longer term, so that the abnormal returns 
occurring is later reversed. Intuitively there should not necessarily be a 
fundamental reason   for   a   company’s   value   to   increase   (decrease)   significantly  
with several percentage points because a certain person buys (sells) stocks. 
However if the abnormal returns continue in the following months, it would be an 
indication of that the celebrities reveal relevant value enhancing information. This 
would further imply that the herding is rational. We also believe that the sign of 
the returns are dependent upon whether it is a purchase or sale. In other words, the 
celebrity investors work as herd leaders, leading other investors to bid the price up 
(down).  
 
4. Data 
 
The observations in this study were found using three databases; the Atekst-
database, the Newsweb database provided by Professor Øyvind Norli and 
Thomson Datastream. Atekst is a search engine within the Retriever database, and 
is the leading provider of historic news media content. The Newsweb database is 
the official database of the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) where, among other, data 
on mandatory notifications of trade and disclosures of large shareholdings are 
announced in real time. The Thomson Datastream is a comprehensive database of 
stock market data, where the returns are gathered.  
4.1 Identifying the events 
In order to identify the events we must first identify the financial celebrities. To 
identify the most prominent financial celebrities, we used the Norwegian 
newspaper database Atekst3.  We  have  defined  a  “financial  celebrity”  as a person 
who   has   been   described   as   either   “bjellesau”,   “profilert   investor”   or  
“kjendisinvestor”   in   the  major   newspapers.  The newspapers which we searched 
within were Dagens Næringsliv and Aftenposten in addition to the online news 
providers E24 and iMarkedet. This procedure however, instantly raises the 
                                                 
3 https://web.retriever-info.com 
GRA 19001 – Master thesis  01.09.2011 
Page 11 
question of a selection bias. This bias occurs when the persons recognized as a 
financial celebrity in the news achieved this recognition on the basis of the 
lucrative trades we later on include in our sample. To avoid this type of selection 
bias we therefore note the date and year when the investor first was recognized as 
a financial celebrity by the media. The trades prior to this date would suffer from 
selection bias and therefore be excluded, while the trades after this date would be 
unproblematic, as the investor is already perceived to be a celebrity, but not on the 
basis of the included observations. Our search returned in a list of 28 investors in 
the period 1992 to 2008, listed in Appendix 1. 
 
Second, as most financial celebrities are known to trade through their companies 
rather than in their own name, these companies were found using the same 
newspapers, as well as the Brønnøysund Register Centre (Brønnøysund Register 
Centre)4. The Brønnøysund Register Centre also includes the NACE industry 
code required for all companies, enabling us to distinguish between operational 
and pure investment and holding companies. This procedure of collecting the 
celebrities trading companies may not capture every company, and we might lose 
some observations by the fact that we have not identified the company. However, 
our experience from gathering data in Newsweb is that the name of the celebrity 
usually is mentioned together with the name of the company in the 
announcements.  
 
Third, the Newsweb database was used to gather information on mandatory 
notifications of trade. Mandatory notification of trade is regulated by the 
Norwegian Securities Act (Norwegian Securities Act  1997)5. Mandatory 
notifications of trade occurs, in short, when primary insiders perform trading, or 
with changes in ownership that hits, exceeds or falls below 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 
25%, 1/3, 50%, 2/3 and 90% of the shares or voting rights. The law also regulates 
the required information to be included in the mandatory notification, most 
importantly, the name of the trader suspect to the mandatory notification (person 
or company), why the trading is subject to the notification as well as the time of 
the trade. 
  
                                                 
4 http://www.brreg.no 
5 Norwegian Securities Act §4 
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As described, the Newsweb database provides real time data, enabling us to 
identify exactly when the market was informed about the transaction. This is a 
feature which would not present if the data was gathered from for example 
newspaper articles, where the information is delayed for an unknown period of 
time. Note that since we would like to study the announcement effects, as well as 
the effect in the longer term, we use the date of the notification, not the date 
related to the actual trade which is typically one day prior to the notification. 
 
In Newsweb, we searched for both the name of the investors, as well as their 
companies. At this stage, the sample of 28 investors was reduced to 18, as ten of 
the investors lacked observations. The reason for this may be that these investors 
trade through unidentified companies, or that their trading is not subject to a 
mandatory notification of trade as described by the Norwegian Securities Act. 
Prior to filtering this returned 287 observations, related to the 18 investors.  
 
As earlier mentioned we used the Brønnøysund Register Centre in order to 
distinguish between operational and pure investment and holding companies. 
Observations involving an operative trader rather than a pure investment- or 
holding company were deleted, in order to avoid effects of synergies and strategic 
trading that could affect stock prices for other reasons than the celebrity effect that 
we analyse. Removing these observations constitutes of removing 86 observations 
from the sample. Further filtering involved removing observations related to 
mergers, equity issuing and acquisitions involving voluntary and mandatory 
offers, based on information enclosed in the mandatory notification. Removing 
these observations constitutes of removing 24 observations from the sample. Both 
these filtering operations help ensure that observations that typically involve large 
fluctuations in stock prices, due to other reasons than what we would like to 
study, does not impact our results by creating a bias. 
 
Final filtering involved removing overlapping observations, caused by the 
investors trading in the same stock for consecutive days. This causes problems in 
the event windows, because one observation may be included as a separate event, 
while it is also included in the post-, or pre-event windows of other observations 
and thereby bias the results drawn from these windows. Our solution to this 
problem was to only include the very first of the overlapping transaction, and 
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delete the rest from our sample, in order to increase the power of our inferences. 
Removing the overlapping observations constitutes of removing 26 observations 
from the sample. Finally, due to missing stock market data 38 observations was 
removed. Although the filtering has been comprehensive, reducing our sample 
from 287 to 113 observations, we believe that these operations have been 
necessary in order to isolate the celebrity effect.  
 
After this filtering we were left with 113 observations related to 13 investors, and 
the final sample is distributed as in table 4.1. One obvious observation is that the 
sample consists of only men. A reason for this may be that there are not very 
many women who have status as a celebrity in the financial markets, and that 
those who are, do not trade enough to be captured by the media. Another aspect of 
our sample is that it consists of 76% purchases and only 24% sales, which may 
cause the results of our analysis to be more powerful for shares bought than shares 
sold. Another potential problem with the distribution of our sample is that John 
Fredriksen constitutes a very large part of the total number of observations. 
 
Table 4.1 
List of the sample of the celebrity investors, based on mandatory notification of trades 
after final filtering and removing observations related to missing stock market data. 
 
Purchases 
 
Sales 
 
Total 
John Fredriksen 31 
 
2 
 
33 
Kjell Inge Røkke 3 
 
0 
 
3 
Trygve Hegnar 2 
 
1 
 
3 
Øystein Stray Spetalen 4 
 
7 
 
11 
Jan Haudemann Andersen 6 
 
5 
 
11 
Jens Ulltveit Moe 14 
 
1 
 
15 
Christen Sveaas 5 
 
1 
 
6 
Arne Blystad 7 
 
5 
 
12 
Tore Aksel Voldberg 1 
 
2 
 
3 
Idar Vollvik 4 
 
1 
 
6 
Edwin Austbø 1 
 
0 
 
1 
Bjørn Rune Gjelsten 6 
 
1 
 
7 
Dagfinn Sundal 2   1   3 
      Total 86   27   113 
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We have investigated the possibility of any specific firm characteristics in terms 
of market to book-ratio and past return. The descriptive statistics are presented in 
table 4.2, however, we have found no evidence of any specific firm characteristics 
of the companies being traded by the celebrity investors.  
 
Table 4.2 
Average market to book ratio and average past 12-months return for the firms in the 
sample. 
 
Firm characteristics 
 Min Max Mean Median Std.dev 
Market to book 0.24 35.05 2.55 1.99 3.76 
Past 12-months return -84.81 % 469.25 % 41.58 % 17.30 % 1.00 
            
4.2 Stock market data 
We had to match our sample of companies with historical stock price data. These 
data were gathered in Thomson Datastream for the period -125 to + 252 trading 
days around the observations. The data gathered were “return   index”,   which  
assumes that dividends are reinvested in the company. This approach will 
smoothen out the effect of the sudden movements in the pure stock price that 
occurs e.g. in the event of stock-splits and after ex-dividend day.  
 
We have chosen to use the market model, based on the OSE return index 
including all companies except the 10% smallest. This index was provided by 
Professor Øyvind Norli and covers our estimation- and event windows. 
4.3 Weaknesses in the data 
The data in this study may suffer from some drawbacks. It would have been 
beneficial to match our observations with analyst recommendations to see if our 
sample of financial celebrities follows these to some extent, and therefore is a 
partial explanation of our results. The problem we encountered was that some of 
the stocks in our sample are small and have little or no analyst coverage dating 
back to 1992. Another drawback in the data is that our sample of trades is mostly 
inside trades, which could induce a bias in the results. This is a result of the 
Norwegian Securities Act much stricter regulations towards insiders rather than 
share of ownership. However, the literature on insider trading gives no consensus 
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as to whether insiders actually do earn abnormal return in the Norwegian market. 
Eckbo and Smith (1998) reports that insiders do not earn any abnormal returns, 
while Einarsen (2009) present evidence that insiders earn an immediate average 
abnormal return of 1.3% in the three days following the trade.   
 
5. Methodology 
 
In the analysis, we have applied an event study approach outlined by Brown and 
Warner (1985), and further developed by several other authors. This methodology 
is designed in order to analyse a well-defined event, and its impact on stock 
prices. In our case, the event itself is the mandatory notification of a transaction 
reported on Newsweb and thereby reaches the public. In an event study, there is 
an estimation window, and an event window. The event window we analyse is 
further divided into three; one pre-event window which spans from five to two 
days prior to the event, an event window which spans from one day before and 
after the event, and a pre-event window which spans from two to 15 days after the 
event. This approach allows us to isolate any movements before the event, the 
event itself, and whether or not there is a positive or negative drift in the days 
following the event.  
 
In order to decide whether or not the observed returns are abnormal in any 
direction, we need to define normal returns, using an estimation window spanning 
from 125 to 6 days prior to the event. The literature provides several examples of 
such methods such as the Capital Asset Pricing Model, Arbitrage Pricing Model, 
the market model, and the constant return model. Although the constant return 
model, using a daily normal return of 0.05%, is considered sufficient in a short 
term event study (Kothari and Warner 2007), we have followed a market model 
approach in our study. This is done because we want to reduce the variance from 
the market, and because we could draw more precise inferences when we compare 
the results from the short and the longer term analysis. The abnormal returns 
follow the formula given by equation 5.1 in all the models.  
 
𝐴𝑅௜௧ = 𝑅௜ఛ − 𝐸(𝑅௜ఛ)        [5.1] 
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It is the 𝐸(𝑅௜ఛ) which separate the models, and in the market model the expected 
return is found using equation 5.2, where the individual stock prices are regressed 
as the independent variable with the market returns as the dependent variable. The 
estimation period used is 125 to 6 days prior to the event. 
 
𝐸(𝑅௜ఛ) = 𝛼௜ + 𝛽௜𝑅௠ఛ  [5.2] 
 
The market model assumes that the expected returns on firm i and the market 
return follow a linear relationship. This eliminates the variance of the market 
movements in the period, and results in a smaller variance in the results. The 
coefficients in equation 5.2 are calculated using the OLS estimator. 
 
In the short term analysis, we have found it reasonable to include five days prior 
to the event and 15 days after the event. The reason for this is that we want to be 
able to measure if there is any drift before the trade is publicly known, in order to 
see if it could be any information leakage in the market. Other reasons for this 
drift is also that the celebrity himself often trades in the preceding days, hence 
there is a possibility that he might bid up or down the price before he reports the 
transaction to the market. We have also included 15 days after the event, in order 
to measure any possible drift in the price in the days following the transaction. We 
have divided the analysis into tree windows; the pre-event window, the event 
window and the post-event window. To illustrate more formally, a transaction is 
reported at t=0. The pre-event window (L1) stretches from t= -5 to t= -2, the event 
window (L2) is from t= -1 to t=1 and the post-event window (L3) stretches from 
t=2 to t=15. 
 
Our longer term analysis is designed to analyse the drift in a longer horizon after 
the transaction, in order to detect any reversion or underreaction not captured in 
the short term study. The longer term event window is divided into four periods; 
the first spans from month 0 to 3, the second from 3 to 6, the third from 6 to 9, 
and the fourth window covers the period from 9 to 12 months. The estimation 
period for the longer term analysis is the same period as used in the short term. 
 
In order to be able to draw inferences from our study, we need to aggregate our 
observations of individual abnormal returns. We start by finding the average 
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abnormal returns (𝐴𝑅തതതത) across securities for each trading day, using formula 5.3. 
We then find the average cumulative abnormal returns (𝐶𝐴𝑅തതതതതത) for each window 
that we analyse, using formula 5.4. 
 
𝐴𝑅തതതതఛ =
ଵ
ே
∑ 𝐴𝑅௜ఛே௜ୀଵ         [5.3] 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅పതതതതതതത(𝜏ଵ, 𝜏ଶ) = ∑ 𝐴𝑅ప௧തതതതതതఛమ௧ୀఛభ         [5.4] 
 
These operations yield three CARs in the short term and four in the longer term 
analysis; one for each period. In order to test the hypothesis that the cumulative 
abnormal returns are significantly abnormal (i.e. significantly different from zero), 
we have to find a measure for the variance in order to calculate standard errors. 
This approach is similar to the one applied by MacKinlay (1997), and the 
following t-distributed test statistic is used: 
 
𝑡 = ஼஺ோതതതതതതௌா(஼஺ோതതതതതത) ~𝑁(0,1)  [5.5] 
 
The standard error of the average CAR is found by formula 5.6. 
 
𝑆𝐸(𝐶𝐴𝑅തതതതതത(𝜏ଵ, 𝜏ଶ)) = ට
ଵ
ேమ
∑ 𝜎ఌ೔ଶ
ఛమ
௧ୀఛభ (𝜏ଵ, 𝜏ଶ)  [5.6] 
 
The variances in 5.6 are the variance from the residuals of the regression.  
 
For comparison reasons we have also applied the constant return model for 
normal returns in the short term study, however our analysis is conducted and the 
empirical results presented on the basis of the methodology using the market 
model, as described above. 
 
6. Empirical results and discussion 
 
The results are organized as follows; first we present the main results from our 
short term analysis before we perform sensitivity analysis of the data in order to 
detect bias in any way. The results are then linked to herding through the issues of 
GRA 19001 – Master thesis  01.09.2011 
Page 18 
market reaction, market efficiency, confidence and rationality. The short term 
analysis is followed by a longer term analysis in order to capture post event 
effects in a longer perspective. After presenting the results, a discussion on the 
celebrity premium is presented together with the trading possibilities arising from 
the results. 
6.1 Short term celebrity investor performance 
We have estimated abnormal returns using an ordinary event study approach as 
described in section 5. Table 6.1 contains the estimates of abnormal and 
cumulative abnormal returns for the days -5 until 15. Considering the event of a 
buy we observe a sudden increase in abnormal return to 1.77% at day -1 and an 
even further jump to 2.79% at day 0. The cumulative abnormal return moves 
correspondingly. The abnormal return from day -5 is cumulating to 8.15% for a 
buy, through day 15. The abnormal returns are cumulated in order to observe the 
total effect, illustrating that the cumulative abnormal return is more of less 
increasing in size throughout the full event window. The small abnormal returns 
prior to the events imply that the celebrity trading is unpredictable for other 
investors, however they might observe abnormal trading and increased demand 
prior to the actual notification. This might explain the abnormal return at day -1. 
 
In the event of a sell, the (negative) cumulated abnormal return is larger. After 
first observing small abnormal returns, we observe consistent negative abnormal 
returns from day -2, cumulating to -12.77% through day 15. Note that unlike in 
the case of a buy, the results from using the market model with sell results in 
larger negative abnormal returns compared to using the constant return model as 
found in Appendix 2 and 3. This is most likely to be caused by the market itself 
going up, increasing the gap of returns.  
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Table 6.1 
Average abnormal return and average cumulative abnormal return at the different 
event days. 86 and 27 observations. 
 
Market model 
 
Buy 
 
Sell 
Event day AR CAR  AR CAR 
-5 -0.32 % -0.32 % 
 
-0.67 % -0.67 % 
-4 0.26 % -0.06 % 
 
0.55 % -0.12 % 
-3 -0.10 % -0.16 % 
 
0.43 % 0.31 % 
-2 0.43 % 0.27 % 
 
-1.53 % -1.22 % 
-1 1.77 % 2.03 % 
 
-1.22 % -2.44 % 
0 2.79 % 4.82 % 
 
-2.70 % -5.14 % 
1 0.55 % 5.38 % 
 
-0.51 % -5.64 % 
2 0.20 % 5.58 % 
 
-0.97 % -6.62 % 
3 0.42 % 6.00 % 
 
0.48 % -6.14 % 
4 0.34 % 6.34 % 
 
-0.56 % -6.70 % 
5 -0.67 % 5.67 % 
 
-0.41 % -7.11 % 
6 0.40 % 6.07 % 
 
-1.07 % -8.18 % 
7 -0.20 % 5.86 % 
 
-0.58 % -8.76 % 
8 *1.15 % 7.01 % 
 
-0.41 % -9.17 % 
9 -0.09 % 6.93 % 
 
-0.05 % -9.21 % 
10 0.11 % 7.04 % 
 
-0.53 % -9.74 % 
11 0.66 % 7.70 % 
 
-0.88 % -10.63 % 
12 0.16 % 7.86 % 
 
-1.05 % -11.68 % 
13 0.43 % 8.29 % 
 
-0.90 % -12.58 % 
14 0.02 % 8.31 % 
 
-0.20 % -12.79 % 
15 -0.16 % 8.15 % 
 
0.01 % -12.77 % 
* The observation is caused by activity in the Altinex stock.     
 
These results confirm our hypothesis, clearly indicating that there is a celebrity 
premium related to the trades performed by the celebrity investors. In other words, 
holding the stocks traded by the celebrity investors will on average result in a 
celebrity premium of 8.15% for a buy and -12.77% for a sell, also confirming our 
hypothesis regarding the sign of the abnormal returns. We also observe that 
trading in the stocks after the celebrity transaction is known to the rest of the 
market would still result in abnormal returns due to drift. These observations 
indicates that there is herding in the Norwegian stock market, most possibly lead 
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by the celebrity investors. These findings are also illustrated in Figure 6.1, clearly 
indicating that there is underreaction, with a positive drift with stocks bought and 
a negative drift, with stocks sold. 
 
 
Figure 6.1: a plot of the average cumulative return in the days around the 
transactions. 
 
In the rest of the short term analysis, we have divided the event window into three 
smaller windows, in order to be able to (1); measure if there is any drift prior to 
the transaction, (2); isolate the effect of the transaction itself and (3); to see if 
there is any drift in the days after the event. If there is any significant abnormal 
return prior to the event, this might indicate that the rumour spread among the 
broker community. Another possible explanation for this is that the celebrities are 
forced to bid up the price in order to be able to purchase the stocks in the market, 
as some of our trades are actually transactions that have been made in the 
preceding days, before they were reported to the market through Newsweb. If we 
find any drift in the price in the following days, this could potentially have several 
reasons that we will discuss later on.  
 
Table 6.2 contains the abnormal returns for the event period from day -5 until day 
15, divided into these smaller event windows. For a buy, these event windows 
reveal a small abnormal return of 0.26% prior to the event, an abnormal return of 
5.11% around the day of the event and then a smaller abnormal return of 2.77% 
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thereafter. For a sell, there is an abnormal return of -1.22% prior to the event, a 
larger abnormal return of -4.43% around the day of the event, increasing to an 
abnormal return of -7.13% thereafter. This indicates that although much of the 
new information is incorporated in the prices around the event, the information is 
still not completely captured in the price as we still observe a positive drift for a 
buy and a negative drift for a sell in the third window. For the first window, the 
observed movement may occur as the abnormal trading is observed in the market, 
although with an unknown investor, because the mandatory notification of trade is 
arriving later. The results are both statistically as well as economically significant, 
although more powerful in the case of a buy due to the relatively small sample 
size in the case of a sell. 
 
Table 6.2 
 Cumulative abnormal returns in the tree different event windows. 86 and 27 
observations. 
 
 
Market model 
 
 
Buy 
 
Sell 
 Event window CAR t   CAR t 
 -5 until -2 0.26 % 0.72 
 
-1.22 % -1.20 
 -1 until 1 5.11 % 8.89 * -4.43 % -3.19 * 
2 until 15 2.77 % 6.97 * -7.13 % -13.58 * 
* Significant at a 1% level, ** Significant at a 5% level, *** Significant at 
a 10% level   
  
6.2 Sensitivity analysis 
One problem with our sample is that there is one person with nearly 30% of the 
observations. In order to avoid the risk of making a biased generalized conclusion 
about   the   celebrity   investors’  performance,   the   abnormal   returns  have  also  been  
calculated without the single largest investor as well as solely with the single 
largest investor. This reduces the sample size to a large degree, but an event study 
approach is still possible to conduct. In doing this, extraordinary performance by 
one single investor will not bias the results as a whole. Referring to table 4.1 in 
the Data section, John Fredriksen, who contributes the most to the sample, have 
both been removed and studied separately, resulting in returns as seen in table 6.3. 
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The tests have only been conducted on buy, as the same analysis for sold stocks 
would suffer from small sample size and hence have low power. 
 
Table 6.3 
 Cumulative abnormal returns for a buy in the tree different event windows. 
Estimated for the single investor and all others separately. 31 and 55 observations. 
 
 
Market model 
 
 
Buy, Single investor 
 
Buy, All other 
investors 
 Event window CAR t   CAR t 
 -5 until -2 -0.39 % -0.81 
 
1.01 % 1.95 ** 
-1 until 1 2.18 % 4.04 * 7.21 % 8.87 * 
2 until 15 4.10 % 8.08 * 1.28 % 2.08 * 
* Significant at a 1% level, ** Significant at a 5% level, *** Significant at a 10% 
level 
  
We observe some differences in the estimates for the single investor and all other 
investors, however the single investor John Fredriksen does not bias the result. 
With the single investor we first observe a small negative cumulative abnormal 
return of 0.39% prior to the event, a positive abnormal return of 2.18% around the 
day of the event then increasing to 4.10% in the last event window. For all other 
investors there is a positive abnormal return of 1.01% prior to the event, a large 
positive abnormal return of 7.21% around the day of the event, and a smaller 
positive abnormal return of 1.28% in the last event window. The results are both 
statistically, as well as economically significant. 
 
In order to help explain the findings of our study, we will now link the results to 
herding through the issues of market reaction, market efficiency, confidence and 
rationality. 
6.3 Market underreaction 
Figure 6.1, as previously presented, clearly indicates that there is an underreaction 
in the short term event window. From table 6.2 this observation is further 
documented, stating that although much of the abnormal returns occur in the days 
around the event, 5.11% and -4.43%, there is still a drift occurring in the 
following days, in the amount of 2.77% and -7.13%. There is no sign of reversion 
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in the short term. This implies that the market does not completely price in the 
new public information immediately and this result leads to question the efficient 
markets theory in the way that new information, namely the trading done by the 
celebrity investors, is neither immediately nor completely reflected in the prices. 
These findings also indicate that the market is inefficient.  
6.4 Investor overconfidence 
The underreaction documented by the short term analysis indicates that the market 
is not fully efficient. This is because the news, if it is considered good or bad, 
should be captured immediately in the stock price, and that no drift should be 
present. One possible explanation for this underreaction is part of the twofold 
subject of investor overconfidence.  
 
The abnormal returns evolve as the stock prices increase and decrease. This is a 
result of increased and decreased demand for the stock suddenly created by the 
information of a buy and a sell from a celebrity investor. This sudden demand is 
closely related to investor overconfidence in the celebrity investor. Assuming no 
other news, the fact that one celebrity investor have bought (sold) stock in itself is 
considered positive (negative) news. This may only occur as other investors 
believe in and have confidence in the celebrity investors. However, when this new 
information in the markets is incorporated over time by the investors, this reveals 
that they initially tend to put too much weight on their own private information 
before realizing the value of the new information. This reaction fits our data well 
in the short term, due to the significant underreaction as well as the immediate 
increase in abnormal returns. 
 
Investor overconfidence is therefore twofold, as it can occur in two opposite ways. 
Either the investors have overconfidence in the celebrity investors or they have 
overconfidence in themselves, as in self-confidence. Odean (1998) also confirms 
this link between overconfidence and market underreaction. Hypothesis is that the 
investors are neglecting   recent   news,   overweighting   one’s   private   information  
hence creating the underreaction, as the one we observe in our study. 
 
While investors’ overconfidence in their own private information is an 
explanation for the underreaction, it still does not explain the significant 
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immediate reaction. This may be due to the other fold of overconfidence, namely 
overconfidence in perceived expert traders. Shiller (2000) has contributed to the 
literature   by   describing   investor   overconfidence   as   “trust   in   experts”.  
Overconfidence   in   the   celebrity   investors   represents   a   large   part   of   Shiller’s  
herding literature, where the author states that this issue is what causes prices to 
increase (decrease) and hence creating the positive (negative) abnormal return, as 
we also observe in our study. The issue of overconfidence, Shiller claims, is also 
closely  related  to  herding,  in  the  way  that  when  someone’s  actions  are  considered  
“cannot  be  wrong”,  one  would  act   in   the  same  manner. In other words, investor 
overconfidence may explain the observation of both the abnormal returns as well 
as the underreaction. 
6.5 Rationality in the short term 
The issue of rationality is twofold and widely studied by authors like Shiller 
(2000) and Welch (2000). As there is no sign of reversion in our short time study, 
but rather underreaction, and trading on such news may be rational and a way for 
investors to follow the celebrity and earn the percentage points created by the 
drift. Although rational on an individual level, the same cannot be said at the 
aggregate level, as that would imply that the stock would continue to grow and 
hence create an irrational bubble that is doomed to burst sooner or later. This 
theory can again be linked to Odean (1998), stating that the overconfident 
investors can cause markets to underreact to the information of rational traders. 
Based on this study, mimicking the trades performed by the celebrity investors 
could be individually rational. 
6.6 Longer term celebrity investor performance 
In section 6.1 we documented a strong reaction, as well as an underreaction, to 
celebrity trading in the short term. We also want to analyse this in the longer term, 
in order to see if there are any significant patterns after the short term. The longer 
term analysis is conducted in the period from the announcement day to day 252 
and provides insights into the rationality aspect of our thesis. If there is a 
significant positive drift after a purchase, which last several months, this indicates 
that it is rational to follow the celebrities in the short term, in order to be a part of 
the expected longer term abnormal returns. Figure 6.2 illustrates rather different 
results between a buy and a sell. In the case of a buy, there is a clear reversion, 
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although not complete, but in the case of a sell the downward sloping trend 
continues, however flattens out, towards the end of our event period. These 
findings confirm the hypothesis of a celebrity premium in the longer term, 
however only partly confirm our hypothesis of reversion.  
 
 Figure 6.2: a plot of the average cumulative abnormal return of the months 
following the transactions. 
 
As figure 6.2 illustrates, reversion is present from the months following month 6 
concerning a buy. This challenges the findings of rational herding from the short 
term analysis. As Shiller claims, although individually rational, herding would be 
irrational on a collective level, because it will induce bubbles. However the 
abnormal returns are not completely reversed. This implies that although there 
seem to be an overreaction to the announcement of celebrity trades, the initial 
short term reaction is still justified. 
 
A closer look at the abnormal returns in each event window confirms the 
reversion observed in the figure. In table 6.4 we have used the same procedure as 
in the short term analysis, and it clearly show the reversion in the case of a buy.  
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Table 6.4 
 Cumulative abnormal returns in the four different event windows, denoted in months. 
86 and 27 observations. 
 
 
Market model 
 
 
Buy 
 
Sell 
 Event window CAR t   CAR t 
 0 until 3 11.12% 31.93 * -33.52 -52.15 * 
3 until 6 6.5% 19.91 * -15.42 -25.04 * 
6 until 9 -8.01% -23.28 * -15.75 -25.25 * 
9 until 12 -0.23% -0.52 
 
-20.82 -33.2 * 
* Significant at a 1% level, ** Significant at a 5% level, *** Significant at a 10% 
level 
  
In table 6.4 we have divided the longer term event window in four windows of 
three months that describe the development in abnormal returns. With a buy we 
observe that the positive abnormal returns are continuing in their existence the 
first six months. However, from month 3 until month 6 the abnormal return is 
decreasing in size. From month 6 until month 12 this trend is partly reversed, with 
a significant negative abnormal return, mainly accruing in the period from 6 to 9 
months after the event. In the event of a sell, the negative abnormal return is 
present throughout the full 12-month period.  
 
In conducting longer term event studies there are several methodical challenges 
that might bias the results. This is because there are several factors which is 
important in the evolution of the stock price, other than the celebrity effect we are 
looking to capture. Kothari and Warner (2007) discuss for example risk 
adjustment and modelling of normal returns. As a result of these issues we would 
not be discussing the actual results, in terms of magnitude from the longer term 
study, but rather conclude that we find evidence of an incomplete reversion in the 
abnormal returns in the longer term for a buy, and not for a sell. The continued 
drift followed by an incomplete reversion implies both an underreaction in the 
first months, as well as a subsequent overreaction to the news of the celebrity 
trading. In the event of a sell, the negative returns continue to exist. 
 
While the issue of rationality have already been discussed for the short term 
observations, these findings also imply that mimicking the celebrity trading, 
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which imply herding in the market, is still individually rational up to the point of 
the overreaction, as defined by Shiller (2000). At the point where the overreaction 
occurs, herding becomes irrational. 
6.7 The Celebrity premium and trading possibilities 
There are several possible reasons for the celebrity premium, implied by the 
abnormal returns in this study. First, the investors may possess extraordinary 
stock picking abilities. The  celebrity  investor’s  private  information  would  then  be  
superior   to   other   investors’   private   information. If this is the case then herding 
would be rational, up to the point of the overreaction which is later on reversed. 
This is because the uninformed traders would trade in the same manner as the 
informed, rational traders. Second, having an experienced celebrity investor on 
board in a company, holding the amount of shares necessary to trigger the 
mandatory notification, may in itself create value and increase expectations of the 
company’s  future value. If this is the case, and the value of the company rationally 
increases, then herding would also be rational. Third, as already discussed, the 
celebrity premium may be caused by overconfidence in the celebrity investors, 
either rational or irrational. The exact reason for the celebrity premium is hard to 
establish, however this study indicates the existence of such a premium and the 
possibility of mimicking the celebrities’  trades  is  present  as  of  underreaction  and  
drift in the short term event window. The longer term study reveals sign of an 
incomplete reversion. In other words, the underreaction has subsequently been 
followed by an overreaction. Both these issues are related to overconfidence in the 
same manner as earlier described. However, most importantly, the incomplete 
reversion in the longer term strengthens the hypothesis of the celebrity investors 
extraordinary stock picking abilities as well as their ability to create value within a 
company. 
 
Our research documents significant abnormal returns both in the case of a buy and 
a sell. The question for practitioners should hence be whether or not this can be 
used to earn risk-adjusted abnormal returns. Our analysis reveals that if investors 
for some reason are able to forecast which stock a celebrity will buy, this investor 
would make an abnormal return of 8.15% on average (table 6.1). This is 
substantial, considering that it is earned in just 21 days. In the more likely 
scenario, where investors are not able to forecast which stocks celebrities will 
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buy, this information is still valuable. If investors mimic the transaction two days 
after the mandatory notification, they will still earn an abnormal return of 2.77% 
on average, in 13 days. In the case of a sell, the results also indicate that following 
the financial celebrities is profitable. If the celebrity sells a stock, other investors 
should follow by shorting the stock. This would result in, on average, an abnormal 
return of 12.77% if the investors somehow are able to forecast the transaction and 
7.13% if the stock is shorted two days following the announcement.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
This   paper   studies   the   impact   of   celebrity   investors’   trading   on   Oslo   Stock  
Exchange, based on the mandatory notifications of trade and the corresponding 
development in stock prices. Through our study we have succeeded in confirming 
our main hypothesis, namely that celebrity investors affect stock prices. Focusing 
mainly on the short term we have documented what we have defines as a celebrity 
premium, based on the abnormal returns. These abnormal returns are created by 
herding in the market, where the celebrity investors represent the implied herd 
leaders. The results are valid for investors included in the sample, and the 
performance of the investor with the most observations is compared to the rest, in 
order to avoid making biased generalizations. In the short term the herding is 
rational, implied by the underreaction to the news and the corresponding drift in 
abnormal returns. In other words, the effect is both immediate and continuing. We 
also observe that the abnormal returns are larger in the case of a sell than in the 
case of a buy, although both are statistically and economically significant. In the 
longer term we find that there is an incomplete reversion in the abnormal returns 
concerning stocks bought, while stocks sold continue its downward drift. This 
partly confirms our hypothesis on this matter. Based on this study there exist 
trading possibilities for other investors by mimicking the celebrity investors 
trading, mainly due to the underreaction in the short term. Three possible reasons 
for the celebrity premium have been presented. The celebrity investors may 
possess superior stock picking ability due to private information, having an 
experienced investor on board in a company may create value and hence increase 
future expectations and other investors overconfidence in the celebrity investors 
may induce them to herd.  
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Further research 
 
The celebrity premium and the inferences drawn in this study are based on 
announcements reported in Newsweb and the corresponding development in stock 
prices, analysed within the event study framework. Further research should aim to 
narrow down the reasons for the celebrity premium, by adjusting for more 
variables in the model of normal returns. Examples of such variables are if the 
story has been covered in the media or if analyst recommendations are changing 
around the time of the announcement. Another important input is the traded 
volume around the event, in order to get a deeper understanding of the market 
reactions to such news.  
 
The event study methodology is limited in its scope, especially in the longer term. 
One alternative could be to utilize the buy-and-hold return approach, and form 
portfolios of the stocks.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Initial investors 
The 28 initial celebrity investors, prior to filtering. 
Name Name Name 
Alexander Vik Jan H. Andersen Ola Mæle 
Arne Blystad Jan Petter Sissener Petter Stordalen 
Arne Fredly Jens Gundersen Petter Sundt 
Bjørn Rune Gjeldsten Jens Ulltveit Moe Ronny Åsland 
Christen Sveaas John Fredriksen Terje Mikalsen 
Christian Rytter Kenneth Sandvold Tore Aksel Voldberg 
Dagfinn Sundal Kjell Inge Røkke Trygve Hegnar 
Edvin Austbø Kristian Siem Øystein S. Spetalen 
Einar Nagell Erichsen Marius Skaugen 
 Idar Vollvik Morten Christian Mo 
   
Appendix 2: Event day, constant return model 
 
Average abnormal return and average cumulative abnormal return at the 
different event days. 86 and 27 observations. 
 
Constant return model 
 
Buy 
 
Sell 
Event day AR CAR  AR CAR 
-5 -0,27 % -0,27 % 
 
1,13 % 1,13 % 
-4 0,53 % 0,26 % 
 
0,28 % 1,41 % 
-3 -0,11 % 0,15 % 
 
0,73 % 2,14 % 
-2 0,35 % 0,50 % 
 
-0,82 % 1,31 % 
-1 1,71 % 2,21 % 
 
-0,82 % 0,49 % 
0 3,60 % 5,81 % 
 
-1,23 % -0,74 % 
1 0,09 % 5,90 % 
 
-0,99 % -1,73 % 
2 0,23 % 6,14 % 
 
-0,35 % -2,08 % 
3 0,47 % 6,61 % 
 
1,12 % -0,95 % 
4 0,34 % 6,95 % 
 
-0,70 % -1,65 % 
5 -0,60 % 6,35 % 
 
-0,01 % -1,67 % 
6 0,18 % 6,53 % 
 
-0,58 % -2,25 % 
7 -0,54 % 5,99 % 
 
0,40 % -1,85 % 
8 *1,18 % 7,17 % 
 
0,24 % -1,60 % 
9 -0,19 % 6,99 % 
 
-0,12 % -1,72 % 
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10 -0,12 % 6,87 % 
 
-0,29 % -2,01 % 
11 0,86 % 7,73 % 
 
-0,31 % -2,32 % 
12 0,14 % 7,88 % 
 
-0,91 % -3,24 % 
13 0,66 % 8,54 % 
 
-0,31 % -3,55 % 
14 -0,22 % 8,32 % 
 
0,55 % -3,00 % 
15 -0,12 % 8,20 % 
 
0,34 % -2,66 % 
* The observation is caused by activity in the Altinex stock. 
 
 
Appendix 3: Event windows, constant return model 
 
Cumulative abnormal returns in the tree different event windows. 86 and 27 
observations. 
 
 
Constant return model 
 
 
Buy 
 
Sell 
 Event window CAR t   CAR t 
 -5 until -2 0,50 % 1,35 *** 1,31 % 1,76 ** 
-1 until 1 5,40 % 9,72 * -3,03 % -4,04 * 
2 until 15 2,30 % 5,28 * -0,93 % -2,03 ** 
* Significant at a 1% level, ** Significant at a 5% level, *** Significant 
at a 10% level   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 Preliminary Thesis Report  BI Norwegian School of Management 
 Do financial celebrities affect stock prices?   Date of submission: 17.01.2011  Campus: BI Oslo  PrograMaster of Science in Bu iness and Economics Supervisor: Øyvind Norli Students: André Straith Amundsen Sjur Jensen Bay  
Preliminary Thesis Report  17.01.2011 
Page i 
Table of Contents 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS................................................................................................................. I 
INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................................... II 
1. MOTIVATION AND ECONOMIC PROBLEM ..................................................................... 1 
1.1 MOTIVATION ........................................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 ECONOMIC PROBLEM ............................................................................................................... 1 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW........................................................................................................... 2 
3. METHODOLOGY ..................................................................................................................... 8 
4. DATA ......................................................................................................................................... 12 
5. REFERENCES .......................................................................................................................... 14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Preliminary Thesis Report  17.01.2011 
Page ii 
Introduction 
In our preliminary thesis report we will line out our motivation and the economic 
problem we have chosen to investigate. In order to increase our knowledge on 
relevant and similar studies, a thorough literature review has been conducted. We 
have further on outlined the methodology we would like to use in our study, on 
the basis of earlier work done by well-known financial researchers. In addition we 
have provided a data section explaining what data we will use, where we will find 
it and important implications we need to consider. Although we find this 
preliminary thesis to be covering most aspects of our study, changes may occur as 
we precede our work. 
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1. Motivation and economic problem 
1.1 Motivation 
There are weekly headliners in the Norwegian business newspapers telling the 
reader that a stock sky rocketed after some famous person bought shares, or that it 
plummeted after another person sold the stock. The persons related to these 
articles are mentioned  because  they  are  seen  as  celebrity  investors  or  “leaders  of  
the   herd”,   and   that   they   implicitly   are   causing the sudden movement in price. 
These claims are either true, or they are used as explanations when there is no 
other obvious reason for the sudden abnormal change in price. Our analysis will 
hopefully give an answer to this. If the claims are true, we should expect an 
economically significant average abnormal movement in the stock price when 
these trades occur. 
1.2 Economic problem 
We will investigate the stock markets immediate reactions to trades done by 
people we have defined to be celebrities in the financial markets, and investigate 
whether they induce abnormal activity. There are indications of herd behaviour in 
the markets, and we want to see if these people are leaders of the herd, and if so, 
to what extent. 
 
Our main research question   is   “Do   financial   celebrities   affect   stock prices?” In 
order to answer this question, and capturing different effects we would like to 
investigate a number of sub questions. Interesting examples of such sub questions 
could be to see if there is a difference between a sale and a purchase, if the trades 
affect the total volume in the stock around the event days and whether or not the 
change  in  price  is  reverting  towards  its’  previous  level.   
  
The questions above are interesting as they could reveal relevant information 
about the mechanisms in the market, i.e. if there is a difference between positive 
and negative news regarding the magnitude of the effect, if the effect is gone 
within short time or whether the effect stays and so on. This is important 
information that can be used further in explaining and understanding the effects 
and their corresponding implications with respect to psychology and rationality. 
Such implications are broadly investigated by others, and included in the literature 
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review. It could also be interesting to divide our sample into different categories, 
dependent upon what causes the report on Newsweb (inside trading, size of the 
transaction etc.), before and after the financial crisis of 2008, or other types of sub 
periods.  
 
Our results will also have implications regarding the efficient market hypothesis, 
assuming that these people do not reveal any new information about the stocks. 
This should hold reasonably well due to the fact that it is not allowed to trade 
based on unrevealed information. If this is the case, the trading activity done by 
our sample of celebrity investors should not affect stock prices. If however it does 
show abnormal activity, it indicating increased trading by “ordinary”   investors 
mimicking the famous investors trading, which in turn drives up the prices, and 
we are back to the question of psychology and rationality in the market. This we 
will try to detect in our analysis. An interesting feature of this part of the study is 
to see if there is a reversion back to normal returns (or even abnormal returns with 
an opposite sign) in the following period, as investors realize that the abnormal 
price change is not driven by fundamentals. Some of these people however are 
known to be good business leaders, and it may be considered positive news in 
itself, if they buy a share of a company. In that case we would expect the effect to 
be permanent and not reverting. This should however be taken care of one way or 
the other, and we have a proposal to a possible solution in the data section.  
 
There are also practical implications, as if our results show that there are 
significant abnormal returns following trades, this could be used in developing 
algorithms for trading based on this information.  
 
2. Literature review 
Up to this point, there has been no research done on this particular topic, as far as 
we know. Hence, we have to find literature in closely related fields of finance. 
The relevant literature is divided into two main categories; the first category is 
related to the efficient market hypothesis and the critique from behavioural 
finance with particular emphasis on herding and media coverage. The second 
category is the event study methodology with its possibilities and restrictions. The 
focus has been on these topics, because we find them relevant to our research 
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problem. We have also included some articles regarding investor psychology, as 
this is also important to be aware of. 
 
All the literature reviewed has been obtained from EBSCO, ISI Web of Science or 
otherwise at the BI Library. The articles reviewed are all well-cited, and mostly 
published in prestigious journals.  
 
An important paper in the modern theory regarding the efficient market 
hypothesis is the review article written by Eugene Fama (1970), where he 
summarizes the research done on the field up to then. This paper describes 
efficiency in the capital markets as “prices  fully  reflect  all  available  information”.  
This however is impossible to test, and a further definition of what is meant by 
“available   information”   is  needed.  Therefore,   the  paper  describes   three   forms of 
efficiency; weak-, semi-strong-, and strong form efficiency. A weak form of 
efficiency describes the state in which the information about historical prices is 
immediately incorporated into the current price. Hence, technical analysis of the 
stock market is meaningless. Empirical results seem to support this type of 
efficiency. Next, if the markets are semi-strong efficient, all public information 
available, other than the stock price (earnings announcements, information about 
the business cycles etc.) itself, is incorporated immediately, and that fundamental 
analysis is useless. Strong form efficiency means that all information (public and 
private) is incorporated into the prices of the securities. This implies that e.g. 
insider information is useless. The strong form efficiency is weakly supported by 
research. In a more recent paper, Fama (1991) has refined these statements, by 
including information about dividend yields, interest rates and so on, in testing for 
weak form efficiency. The two last types of tests of efficiency (semi-strong and 
strong), is now called “event studies” and   “tests   for   private   information” 
respectively. 
 
A problem in the tests for market efficiency is the problem of the joint hypothesis 
(Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay 1997). This problem is caused by the fact that a 
model  of  equilibrium  prices,  investors’  risk  preferences  etc.  is  assumed,  and  then  
tested on the data. Hence, these efficiency tests are always a test of whether the 
market is efficient or not, or if the assumed model of expected returns is correct, 
or both.  
Preliminary Thesis Report  17.01.2011 
Page 4 
 
A later review article (Fama 1998) discusses the large body of event studies which 
seem to reject the efficient market hypothesis. The articles reviewed by the author 
shows that there are both over-, and under reactions in the stock market, and this 
suggests that the market is not fully efficient (i.e. does not incorporate new 
information immediately). However, as Fama points out; the evidence of both 
over-, and under reactions are split into two roughly equal parts, hence these 
results may be attributed to chance.  
 
There is an extensive literature criticizing the EMH, and we will now proceed 
with   a   deeper   analysis   of   the   research   done   on   herd   behavior   and   media’s  
influence on the stock market. These are both mechanisms analyzed in the field of 
behavioral finance, and which are related to our research question. 
 
Several studies of herd behaviour have been performed. Shiller (2000) 
investigates herd behaviour in his book Irrational Exuberance. Here, the author 
describes the phenomena of herding in the financial markets, which is the part 
reviewed here. In order to explain herding, Shiller cites experiments, saying that 
when someone’s actions  are  considered  “cannot be  wrong”, then one would act in 
the same manner. Shiller also cites another experiment   and   states   “that   people  
have learned that when experts tell them something is all right, it probably is, even 
if it does not seem so”. These issues are all related to the aspect of 
overconfidence.  Shiller continues with that even completely rational people can 
participate in herd behaviour when they take into account the judgements of 
others, and even if they know that everyone else is behaving in a herdlike manner. 
Although individually rational, the group behaviour would be irrational, arising 
from information cascade, defined  as  theories  of  “the  failure  of  information  about  
true  fundamental  value  to  be  disseminated  and  evaluated”. 
 
Further, Scharfstein and Stein (1990) presented an article on herd behaviour and 
investment, how managers simply mimic the investment decisions of other 
managers. Although such decisions may be inefficient, they take place because 
managers are concerned with   their   reputation  and   the  risk  of  being  “lone   fools”.  
As with all unpredictable components, prediction errors occur. However by 
mimicking   they  will   also   be   “sharing   the   blame”.  Several   effects  may   therefore 
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drive herd behaviour, many of them psychological. The authors, more relevantly, 
also relates the same basic insight to the stock market, where herd behaviour 
could provide a partial explanation for excessive stock market volatility and the 
amplification of exogenous shocks. Related to our topic, the psychological aspects 
provided in this study may explain why investors mimic other, well-known 
investors in order to compensate for the unpredictability in the market.   
 
Nofsinger have written two articles on herding and institutional investors, with 
Sias (Nofsinger and Sias 1999) and with Kim (Kim and Nofsinger 2005). 
Nofsinger and Sias document strong positive correlation between changes in 
institutional ownership and returns. These results, they claim, suggest either 
institutional investors’ positive-feedback trade more than individual investors or 
institutional herding impacts prices more than herding by individual investors. In 
addition they find that stocks purchased by institutional investors subsequently 
outperform those they sell in the following year, revealing no evidence of 
irrationality. The authors further argue that price momentum after herding is 
consistent with the herding moving prices towards equilibrium and is thus 
stabilizing. If momentum traders drive the prices too high, the concern is that this 
would ultimately cause a price bubble.  
 
In the second article, Kim and Nofsinger have investigated herding and feedback 
trading by institutional and individual investor in Japan, a country known for its 
long-term business relationships. These relationships allow for the institutions to 
have better private information than outsiders. Herding based on this superior 
information is referred to as investigative herding. Different types of firms, during 
different economic regimes were analysed, concluding that herding affected 
current-, prior- and  subsequent  year’s  return. This may be directly related to our 
research in the way that the financial celebrities may have, or are believed to have, 
private information, even though Norway has a different business culture. 
 
Shiller (1984) has written an article on stock prices and social dynamics. Unlike 
Nofsinger, Shiller has focused on herding by individual investors. He states that, 
as   “investing   in   speculative   assets   is   a   social   activity   (…)   it   is   plausible   that  
investors’  behaviour  (and  hence  prices  of  speculative  assets)  would  be  influenced  
by  social  movements”.  Shiller  presents  evidence  that  social  movements,  fashions, 
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or fads are likely to be important, or even the dominant cause of speculative asset 
price movements.  
 
So far we have reviewed several influential articles regarding herd behaviour in 
the market. The researchers have all found evidence of different aspects of herd 
behaviour, as well as possible explanations. These results should be useful in our 
thesis, drawing the parallel to herding in the Norwegian stock market, possible led 
by the financial celebrities. Further on we would like to review studies regarding 
the role of media in the stock market. If the media play a role in changing stock 
prices, this would be strongly related to our thesis. 
  
Tetlock (2007) have investigated the role of media in the stock market. The author 
found that high media pessimism predicts a downward pressure on prices, 
followed by a reversion to fundamentals. In addition, high or low pessimism 
usually also predicts high trading volume. The findings suggest that measures of 
media content serve as a proxy for investor sentiment or non-informational 
trading.   The   author’s   motivation   has   been to provide theories of abnormal 
movements in the stock market that are seemingly unjustified by fundamentals, as 
we might observe in our study.  
 
Fang and Peress (2009) have investigated the relation between media coverage 
and expected stock returns. Mass media has a broad reach and the hypothesis is 
that security pricing is affected, even if the media does not supply genuine news. 
However, as one might expect this effect, the study shows that stocks with no 
media coverage earn higher returns than stock with high media coverage. It seems 
to   be,  what   the   authors   name,   a   “no-media   premium”.  The   authors   provide   two  
main explanations, namely that it is a liquidity phenomenon or a compensation for 
imperfect diversification. The study further on shows that the media effect is 
stronger the more incomplete the information is to begin with, as with small firms, 
with low analyst coverage and high fraction of individual ownership. The authors 
also provide an important implication of the media, that due to publication delays, 
it is unlikely that the information provided is actual news. In our own thinking, 
this may also be the case for non-printed media, as there still are sources of delay 
present. This is in fact one of the reasons why we have chosen to only use 
Newsweb data. 
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As we have not found studies directly related to the one we would perform, we 
have also chosen to include two studies directly related to different psychological 
aspect, in addition to an insider study at OSE, the same arena as in our study.  
 
Edmans, García and Norli (2007) have presented a study on sports sentiment and 
stock returns.  By introducing a mood variable, international sports results, the 
authors  have  found  that  losses  have  a  negative  effect  on  the  losing  country’s  stock  
market. In other words claiming that the loss effect in caused by a change in 
investor  mood.  Although  our  study  does  not   involve   investors’  mood,   this  study  
shows that there are diversified psychological aspects of the stock market, and that 
investors may behave irrationally. 
 
More importantly Hirshleifer (2001) have written an article on investor 
psychology and asset pricing based on psychological pricing theories. Instead of 
using the basic paradigms of asset pricing, the author discusses a broader 
approach based on the psychology of investors, determined by both risk and 
misevaluation. This is a much less understood model than risk premium in a 
purely rational dynamic model. An extensive amount of psychological effects is 
discussed in order to capture the reality, and some of them may be at our interest. 
 
Eckbo and Smith (1998) have written an article on insider trading at Oslo stock 
exchange. The authors have investigated the conditional performance of insider 
trades on OSE and found zero or negative abnormal performance during 1985 
through 1992, a period with relatively lax insider regulations and enforcement. 
The result differs from the result of studies performed in US and UK markets, 
presented by other scientists, however using a different approach. Instead of the 
traditional event study approach, Eckbo and Smith have developed a new 
empirical methodology, a construction of a portfolio that tracks all movements of 
insiders in and out of the OSE firms. Possible explanations for the result are that 
insiders may only rarely possess inside information or that the value of 
maintaining corporate control benefits offset the value of trading on such 
information. 
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Our thesis will utilize an event study approach, and therefore a thorough review of 
this literature is required. In the literature review, the Kothari and Warner (2007) 
will be reviewed while MacKinlay (1997), which provides a more organized setup 
of how to conduct the study, is reviewed in the methodology chapter. These are 
both relatively recent articles, and they both review previous influential articles on 
this subject, like Brown and Warner (1980) and (1985). However, all these articles 
emphasize much of the same aspects in the implementation of an event study 
methodology in finance.  
 
The event study literature has become more and more extensive during the last 
decades, and continues to draw attention. This type of methodology is mostly 
utilized in the analysis of corporate actions like stock splits, earnings 
announcements etc., and to test for market efficiency in capital markets. 
Methodically, such event studies can be divided into two main types, depending 
upon the length of the event window; long-term and short-term studies. Long-term 
studies use an event window of one year or more. We will utilize a short-term 
methodology, and we will not discuss the issues to be considered in conducting a 
long-term event study.  
Event studies have proved to be a powerful tool to analyze specific events within 
or outside the firm, and to see if these events have any impact. If the period where 
the event occurs is known with absolute certainty, a sample size of only six 
observations will be sufficient to detect the effects 100% of the time. However, 
this percentage is dramatically reduced in the case where the event is not known. 
In other words; the power of the methodology is high when the time of the event 
is known with certainty and low if it is not. The article also points out strength and 
weaknesses regarding sensitivity of the test statistic with respect to the expected 
return, the variance of the abnormal return and so on. 
 
3. Methodology 
We will use an event study approach in our analysis, because it is the immediate 
effect of the trades that is  interesting  for  us.  Craig  MacKinlay’s  article  from  1997 
outlines an organized setup on how to conduct an event study, which will now be 
summarized. The methodology is divided into steps, in order to get a clearer view. 
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Step 1. Define the event of interest and identify the event period. In our case, the 
event is the trades done by financial celebrities, and the event period is the day it 
is known and reported to the market. We assume that the market is informed by 
the Newsweb database.   
 
Step 2. Identify the requirements for the observations to be included in the dataset. 
In our case, this will be trades on OSE which is reported in Newsweb.  
 
Step 3. Deciding what normal returns are, in order to compare the normal with the 
actual, and the difference between is defined as the abnormal return (AR) as 
shown in equation 3.1. The stock returns are gathered from Datastream. The 
article outlines two different approaches to measure expected returns; the constant 
mean return model and the market model. In the model of constant mean returns, 
shown in equation 3.2, the expected return of firm i at  time  τ is equal to the mean 
return.  
 
𝐴𝑅௜௧ = 𝑅௜ఛ − 𝐸(𝑅௜ఛ)        [3.1] 
𝐸(𝑅௜௧) = 𝑅పഥ          [3.2] 
        
The market model assumes that the expected returns on firm i and the market 
return follow a linear relationship. This eliminates the variance of the market 
movements in the period, and results in a smaller variance in the results. The 
coefficients in equation 3.3 are calculated by using the OLS procedure and are 
therefore the OLS estimators.  
 
𝐸(𝑅௜ఛ) = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑅௠ఛ + 𝜖ఛ         [3.3] 
 
To generalize, both models measures abnormal returns as in equation 3.4, and Xt 
is constant in the constant return model, and it is a linear relationship to the 
market as shown in equation 3.3 in the market model.  
 
𝐴𝑅 = 𝑅௜ఛ − 𝐸(𝑅௜ఛ|𝑋ఛ)       [3.4] 
 
There are several other models to model normal returns. These include utilizing 
the Capital Asset Pricing model (CAPM) (Sharpe 1964) (Lintner 1965), the 
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Arbitrage Pricing model (APT) (Ross 1976) with Fama-French three factor model 
(Fama and French 1993) or other multifactor models. However, there are 
problems with these models; in recent years, the errors and the deviations in the 
CAPM model have been emphasized, hence utilizing it might reduce the validity 
of our study. This model was used in the event studies of the seventies, but have 
nearly ceased. When it comes to the APT, it does not give guidelines as to which 
factors to include, and studies by Brown and Weinsten (1985) indicate that the 
most significant variable in the APT is the market factor. Based on these 
arguments, a market model of normal returns should be utilized. However, 
Kothari and Warner (2007) argue that if the event window is relatively small, as it 
is in our case, the model of expected returns is not very relevant. Hence they argue 
that a normal return of about 0.05% daily (about 13% annually) is sufficient, and 
the errors induced by this approach will be economically insignificant because a 
typical observation in the event window is a return of around 1%. Therefore, there 
is not much information lost in the simple approach and this model of expected 
returns is likely to be used in the thesis. 
 
Step 4. Define the estimation window, event window and the post event window, 
as outlined in the figure 3.1. MacKinlay suggests an estimation window of 
approximately 120 days prior to the event and the event window should optimally 
be the day the event occurs. This may be problematic because there is uncertainty 
surrounding when the market processes the new information, depending on when 
the market close that particular day and when the information is published on 
Newsweb. To solve this, we extend the event window to some days before and 
after the event is reported, in order to be sure to capture the event. This is 
relatively unproblematic, and the power of the test is still high (Campbell, Lo, and 
MacKinlay 1997). The post-event window is optional and is included to give the 
calculated normal returns increased validity, by also including this period in the 
estimation of normal returns. An important issue to be aware of at this stage of the 
process is that the event window and the estimation window must not overlap. 
This may cause the observations in the event window to heavily influence the 
estimation results.  
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Figure 3.1: Time line for event studies (MacKinlay 1997) 
 
A more formal description of these windows is  to  define  τ = 0 as the day the trade 
occurs,   τ = T1+1 to T2 is   the   event  window   and   τ = T0 to T1 as the estimation 
window. Further, let L1 = T1-T0 be the length of the estimation window and L2 = 
T2-T1 be the length of the event window. This notation on the two windows is 
used in the estimators shown in the next step. Note that we will not include the 
post-event window in the thesis.  
 
Step 5. Design the testing framework. At this stage we want to obtain the 
abnormal returns, conditional upon the most suitable model of normal returns. 
The abnormal returns are found by equation 3.4. 
 
The null hypothesis is that the trades in the event window have no impact on the 
returns (i.e. abnormal returns are zero). In order to draw valid overall inferences 
of the abnormal returns, they are aggregated both across securities and time. 
When the numbers are aggregated, we find the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) 
in the event window, shown in 3.5: 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅௜(𝜏ଵ, 𝜏ଶ) = ∑ 𝐴𝑅௜௧ఛమ௧ୀఛభ         [3.5] 
 
The CAR measures the first moment (i.e. the mean) only, as this is most relevant 
for our thesis, as this is a measure of change in shareholders wealth. Note that the 
event window may further be divided into two or more sub periods but this will 
not be explained in any detail at this point, although it might be interesting for the 
thesis. 
The next thing to do now is to find the average abnormal return, across securities, 
which is found by equation 3.6. 
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𝐴𝑅തതതതఛ =
ଵ
ே
∑ 𝐴𝑅௜ఛே௜ୀଵ         [3.6] 
 
To test for abnormal returns, we must find the average CAR across securities 
using equation 3.7.  
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅തതതതതത = ∑ 𝐴𝑅పതതതതത௡௜ୀଵ          [3.7] 
 
Then we will use the test statistic shown in equation 3.8 provided by MacKinlay 
(1997). This test is Student-t distributed, with L1-2 degrees of freedom, and 
E(θ)=0.   
 
𝜃 = ஼஺ோതതതതതതௌா(஼஺ோതതതതതത) ~𝑁(0,1)        [3.8] 
 
Step 6. At this stage, we have obtained results, and now we should be able to draw 
inferences, discuss strengths and weaknesses and so on. For example if the sample 
size is small, one should discuss extreme observations. A presentation of the 
diagnostics is also necessary at this point. 
 
4. Data 
We use data on trading announcements from Newsweb, and combine these with a 
database of stock returns from some other database (Datastream etc.) to obtain a 
dataset. Optimally we should have known every trade these persons have done, 
but we do not have this kind of information and it is assumed that this is unknown 
for the rest of the market as well. 
 
To identify the persons assumed to be followed by the market, we have made a 
list  of  people  identified  as  “bjellesauer”  or  “profilert  investor”  in  Norway’s largest 
newspapers since 1992 using the Atekst database. The list of persons is as 
follows: 
 
John Fredriksen 
Kjell Inge Røkke 
Trygve Hegnar 
Petter Stordalen 
Øystein Stray Spetalen 
Jan Haudemann Andersen 
Jens Ulltveit Moe 
Arne Fredly 
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Christen Sveaas 
Arne Blystad 
Tore Aksel Voldberg 
Idar Vollvik 
Edvin Austbø 
Alexander Vik 
Kenneth Sandvold 
Kristian Siem 
Bjørn Rune Gjeldsten 
Dagfinn Sundal 
Jan Petter Sissener 
Ola Mæle 
Petter Sundt 
Jens Gundersen 
Christian Rytter 
Terje Mikalsen 
Morten Christian Mo 
Ronny Åsland 
Einar Christopher Nagell Erichsen 
Marius Skaugen 
 
To avoid selection bias, that the events we include later becomes the reason why 
we included the persons in the first place, we have to make sure only to use the 
events after the investor have already been identified as a celebrity by the media. 
On the other hand, if we detect over- or under reaction it still violates the efficient 
market hypothesis as the market fails to properly price the firms. 
 
Another problem with our approach is that some of these investors are known for 
their entrepreneurial skills, and an abnormal movement in the stock price should 
be perfectly consistent with the efficient market hypothesis. A solution may be to 
include  only  their  personal  trading,  and  not  their  companies’  acquisitions  etc.  (i.e.  
for Fredriksen we will include trades originating from Hemen and Geveran and 
not Seadrill and Frontline). Another possible weakness with the sample is that 
some of the celebrity investors in the Norwegian market are left out. It is nearly 
impossible to include all, but we assume that the search criterion used in Atekst 
provides a representative sample. 
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